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 1 Introduction 
During the last decade, we have seen the rise of a new generation of personal devices that 
has revolutionized our daily lives. The reduction of integration scales of computer components as 
well as the efforts to develop new communication technologies, and the advances to enlarge power 
battery lifetime, has led to an evolution of the functionalities traditionally offered by mobile phones. 
Such functionalities are addressed to offer new services that will redefine our relationship with 
other individuals thus gradually approaching that many have a deep impact on the security of 
mobile devices. Unfortunately these are just some examples showing the magnitude of the problem. 
Consequently, the provision of mechanisms to preserve the security in our daily mobile devices is as 
important as the need for methodologies and approaches to analyse the level of security they 
provide to such devices. Although their use is generalized in developed countries, and is 
increasingly common to find them in various forms, sizes or names (tablets, eye-wear, watches), 
their most important boom is taking place in developing countries, even overcoming the 
conventional PC, given the higher capabilities they offer at a lower cost. 
The architecture of these devices, increasingly diverse and complex, is now more similar to 
personal computers.  This fact is illustrated through the extended use of operating systems (OS) 
addressed to mobile devices. The pioneer in the field of mobile phones was Apple, with its iPhone, 
which incorporates IOS. This system captures much of the market share.  Windows'  proposal is 
called Windows Phone, but it lacks of enough acceptance. Finally we have the Android operating 
system,  the most widespread. It has significant market share because it is freely available and each 
manufacturer can adapt it  to their own mobile phone.  In the last five years the Android operating 
system  has  experienced  a  tremendous  growth,  becoming  the  best-selling  operating  system for 
mobile devices. It is based on a robust Linux kernel, and is designed for touch-screen phones or 
tablets. Currently, Android has 75% of the market share. Part of its success is due to the facility of 
customization offered by the operating system. Unfortunately, this same reason has become Android 
in  the  main  target  of  malware  developers.  Basically,  developers  try  to  exploit  potential 
vulnerabilities resulting from modifications made by the device manufacturer, or the negligence of 
application developers, as they often do not bear in mind the recommendations set out to create a 
program. 
Lately, we have seen more and more cases of serious vulnerabilities, such as the ability to 
remotely  wipe  a  terminal  (especially  affecting  Samsung  devices)  or  run  malicious  codes  [24]. 
Security is important for any device, but it is particularly important in personal devices in which we 
stored all kind of information concerning the private life of users, such as emails, photos, etc.. 
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Currently there are almost barely tools to evaluate the Android system security. Although 
there have been various studies as those shown in [7] [28], [29], [30], [31], [32], and gradually new 
frameworks are emerging, such as Mercury, AndroGuard, ASEF, etc., there is still a long way to go 
in determining with rigour the degree of vulnerability of the system. One of the most important 
steps in the development of a new device and its potential applications, is the assessment of their 
vulnerabilities and that today, in the realm of Android, is a topic with a huge room for improvement. 
Thus, the main objective of this master's thesis is to study the security issues of mobile 
devices  based  on  the  Android  operating  system.  By  covering  this  goal,  we  expect to  answer 
questions such as:
◦ How to classify current applications for vulnerability assessment on Android?
◦ What kind of vulnerabilities can be exploited on Android systems?
◦ Is there any way to systematise the injection of attack on Android systems to show their 
security bottlenecks?
◦ What kind of results can be obtained from evaluating the security of real mainstream 
devices
To address these issues, the rent of this master's thesis is structured as follows: Chapter II  
introduces the Android systems and its most important security threats. Chapter III presents current 
security application, classified according to a novel taxonomy. Chapter IV proposes a methodology 
to apply the most  interesting properties identified in Chapter III from an experimental viewpoint. 
At the chapter V we can see the case of study. Chapter VI shows the results of a case study where 
different mobile devices have been evaluated using our methodology. Finally, chapter VII concludes 
this master's thesis with the most important remarks. At the chapter IX we can see the Annex, with a 
tool created for us, to automate some tasks, and we can see too, the poster showed at ITACA work 
day.
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 2 Android in a nutshell
This section explains how Android works. We will briefly introduce all the elements that 
compound  Android,  especially  focusing  on  the  Android  components  and  the  communications 
among one another.
 2.1 Android layers
Let's start off by taking a look at the overall system architecture of the Android stack in the Figure 1 
we have a graphical overview from the Android layers.
At the lowest level we find is the Linux Kernel. Android uses Linux for its device drivers, 
memory management, process management, and networking. 
The next  level  up  contains  the  Android  native  libraries.  They  are  all  written  in  C/C++ 
internally, but you'll be calling them through Java interfaces. In this layer you can find the Surface 
Manager (for compositing windows), 2D and 3D graphics, Media codecs (MPEG-4, H.264, MP3, 
etc.), the SQL database (SQLite), and a native web browser engine (WebKit). 
Next is the Android runtime, including the Dalvik Virtual Machine. Dalvik runs dex files, 
which are converted at compile time from standard class and jar files. Dex files are more compact 
10
Figure 1: Android architecture layers
and  efficient  than  class  files,  an  important  consideration  for  the  limited  memory  and  battery 
powered devices that Android targets. 
The core Java libraries are also part of the Android runtime. They are written in Java, as is 
everything above this layer.  Here,  Android provides a substantial  subset of the Java 5 Standard 
Edition packages, including Collections, I/O, and so forth. 
The next level up is the Application Framework layer. Parts of this tool-kit are provided by 
Google, and parts are extensions or services customized by the manufactures. The most important 
component of the framework is the Activity Manager, which manages the life cycle of applications 
and a common "back-stack" for user navigation.
Finally, the top layer is the Applications layer, where ours apps are typically located, such as 
the Phone and Web Browser utilities.
Since applications become an important security bottleneck we will pay especial attention to 
them in the rest of this chapter.
Android applications are built using essential components blocks, each of which exists as its 
own entity  and plays  a specific  role,  each item is  a unique piece that  helps define the overall 
behaviour of the application. It is noteworthy that some of these elements are the entry point for 
users to interact with the application and in many cases we see that depend on other elements.
There are four types of components in an Android application. Each has a purpose and a 
different  life  cycle  that  defines  how it  creates  and destroys  the  component.  Activities,  Intents, 
Contents Providers, Services and Broadcasts receivers.
 2.2 Application Components
As we can read in the Google developers guide,  application components are the essential 
building blocks of an Android application. Each component is a different point through which the 
system can enter your application. Not all components are actual entry points for the user and some 
depend on each other, but each one exists as its own entity and plays a specific role—each one is a 
unique building block that helps define your application's overall behaviour. In this section we will 
link the components with the potential vulnerabilities.
Activities 
An activity represents a single screen with a user interface. For example, an email application 
might have one activity that shows a list of new emails, another activity to compose an email,  
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and  another  activity  for  reading  emails.  Although  the  activities  work  together  to  form a 
cohesive user experience in the email application, each one is independent of the others. As 
such,  a different  application can start  any one of these activities (if  the email  application 
allows it). For example, a camera application can start the activity in the email application that 
composes  new  mail,  in  order  for  the  user  to  share  a  picture.  Here  we  can  find  some 
vulnerabilities (Invalidated Input vulnerability) when we start an activity we have to do it 
through an Intent, in this Intents often, we have to include some fields like Integers, Strings or 
similar,  the problem begin with the no validation of  these fields  by the developer  of the 
activity, that receives the intent, a malicious app can launch a malformed intent an if we didn't 
filtered the fields, we can receive a String in the field where we expect an Integer for example, 
making the app crash.
Services 
A service is a component that runs in the background to perform long-running operations or to 
perform work for remote processes. A service does not provide a user interface. For example, 
a service might play music in the background while the user is in a different application, or it 
might fetch data over the network without blocking user interaction with an activity. Another 
component, such as an activity, can start the service and let it run or bind to it in order to 
interact with it. In this component we can find the typical Denial of service (DoS) attack, for 
example we can launch a series of services that requires a lot of CPU, for example a complex 
algorithm, to reach the objective of exhaust the battery of the mobile device, the user of that 
mobile  will  not  understand why the  battery  runs  out  so  quickly,  because  the  services  in 
Android doesn’t require a layout so it runs in background.
Content providers 
A content provider manages a shared set of application data. You can store the data in the file 
system,  an  SQLite  database,  on  the  web,  or  any  other  persistent  storage  location  your 
application can access. Through the content provider, other applications can query or even 
modify the data (if the content provider allows it). For example, the Android system provides 
a content provider that manages the user's contact information. As such, any application with 
the proper permissions can query part of the content provider (such as ContactsContract.Data) 
to read and write information about a particular person. Content providers are also useful for 
reading and writing data that is private to your application and not shared. For example, the 
Note Pad sample application, uses a content provider to save notes. In this case we can find a  
pair  of  vulnerabilities,  first  the  acces-control,  we  can  access  to  Contents  Providers  from 
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another  apps  or  from  the  OS,  without  requiring  a  special  permission,  and  the  second 
vulnerability  the  Bypass,  the  Content  Provider  of  an  app  is  supposedly  protected  against 
unauthorized access by others apps by the sandbox, but it's  proved that we can cross that 
sandbox easily[45], this is a big problem, because we're not sure if the information that we 
store in our Content Provider is secure or not.
Broadcast receivers 
A broadcast receiver is a component that responds to system-wide broadcast announcements. 
Many broadcasts originate from the system—for example, a broadcast announcing that the 
screen has turned off, the battery is low, or a picture was captured.  Applications can also 
initiate  broadcasts—for  example,  to  let  other  applications  know that  some data  has  been 
downloaded to the device and is available for them to use. Although broadcast receivers don't 
display a user interface, they may create a status bar notification to alert the user when a 
broadcast event occurs. More commonly, though, a broadcast receiver is just a "gateway" to 
other components and is intended to do a very minimal amount of work. For instance, it might 
initiate a service to perform some work based on the event. In this component we can find 
another access-control vulnerability, we can launch a System Broadcast, that supposedly only 
the  OS can  launch,  like  Dreaming_Started  or  Dreaming_Stopped,  launching  this  type  of 
broadcasts  we  can  modify  the  behaviour  of  a  app  that  considers  that  broadcasts,  like 
modifying their operations or just stopping it.
 2.3 Communication between components
The communication between the  Android components  is  essential.  Android uses  an IPC 
(Inter Process Communication) mechanisms, very similar  to that  used on IOS (Apple operative 
system),  to  allow  the  communication  among  the  processes  of  the  system.  Interprocess 
communication (IPC) is a set of programming interfaces that allow a programmer to coordinate 
activities among different program processes that can run concurrently in an operating system. This 
allows a program to handle many user requests at the same time. Since even a single user request  
may result in multiple processes running in the operating system on the user's behalf, the processes 
need to communicate with each other. The IPC interfaces make this possible. Each IPC method has 
its own advantages and limitations so it is not unusual for a single program to use all of the IPC 
methods.  There are three types of IPC mechanisms in Android:
• Intents, are messages between components.  They are a mechanism to pass data between 
processes.  Through  intents  one  can  starts  services  or  activities,  or  invoke  broadcast 
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receivers.
• Bundles,  are  entities  to  encapsulate  data.  Their  use  is  similar  to  the  concept  of  object 
serialisation, but faster in Android.
• Binders, are entities that allow the permissions to obtain a reference to another service as 
well as to send messages.
 But we have some studies that the IPC is not as strength as we think, in [25] we can read that 
we are able to crash the Android runtime from unprivileged user processes, because the exception 
handling is a rarity between the Android developers.
 2.4 Android, a vulnerable system
Even though our device contains vulnerabilities, they may not be exploitable, ie, although 
our system contains multiple vulnerabilities, this does not mean that this is vulnerable, as these can 
be not exploited, either because they are unaware of just no-one known to exist, although they are in 
our system, because they are not accessible, not having a tool that possibility us to access them. 
One of the consequences is that they simplify the attacks on our system, as it is much easier to try to 
exploit a weakness in our system to be tested potential vulnerabilities in our system, the means to 
exploit  a  vulnerability  in  the  attack and subsequent  consequences  can  be of  any kind,  theft  of 
private information, introduction of erroneous data in the system, denial of services, remote control 
socket terminal or just, turn our mobile device to a brick.
Securing an open platform as Android requires a robust security architecture and rigorous 
security programs. Android was designed with multi-layered security that provides the flexibility 
required for an open platform, while providing protection for all users of the platform. Android 
considers the use of security controls to reduce damage of the bugs introduced by developers. Thus, 
even less skilled developers can work with and rely on flexible security controls. Unfortunately the 
design  of  these  controls is  vulnerable  to  malware,  and  attacks  on  third-party  applications  on 
Android. Android was designed to reduce both the probability of these attacks and greatly limit the 
impact of the attack in the event it was successful. However, despite such efforts Android is still a 
vulnerable system.
Some studies claim that in late 2013, the Android system, could be threatened by over 1 
million threats as we can read in [26], as on Figure 4 shows. One of the main causes is that is that  
Google is much more flexible than Apple and therefore does not restrict the freedom of users when 
changing their mobile system. But delving a little more, the above answer that we have is a little 
short, if you look at the mechanism of use we found large differences as we can see in the figure 2. 
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On the one hand we have Google, that has delegated the control of the Android operative system to 
mobile producers, and the decision of when and how they will upgrade your operating system, so 
we are in a market, in which there are many versions of Android as manufacturers, for this reason, 
we have one of the biggest problems of Android, the fragmentation, on the other hand we have 
Apple, which is the leading version control and delivers these versions directly to users.
Talking bout the fragmentation of Android, let us illustrate the below example, with some 
graphics, considering data from Google, the most common version is 2.3 (44%), as we can see in 
the figure 3, is was last updated in September 2011, while the 4.1 version only 14.9% used, and 
very likely to get forgotten, because the version called “Key Lime Pie” will be released soon. By 
contrast, Apple got that over 20% of its users were in version 6.1, after 36 hours of this release. We 
can read more about most used versions in [27]
15
Figure 2: Android SO distribution
For the end user, it may sound trivial, but it is not. The Android updates, has associated 
security enhancements and more features. The above cycle, makes updates slower, opening one 
window  to  the  hackers,  allowing  them  to  create  new  malware  to  exploit  the  vulnerabilities 
discovered. And so the malware charts show disturbing increases.
16
Figure 3: Android versions
At the above picture we can see the Android threats in 2012, as we can see the number of 
hazards  are  increasing  monthly,  illustrating  that  data  we  have  the  figure  5,  and  mainly  affect 
android. That numbers are disturbing, we can see that in early 2012, the threats were only 3000, 
only in four months that threats were almost quadruplicate the initial number, closer to 11.000, but 
not only that, in the last 6 months of the year, the number has increased to the amazing amount of 
129.000, 43 times more than in the beginning of the year! Where we will en up! If we don't stop 
that, that problem may will end with Android.
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Figure 4: Android threats
Now, we will explain the most common vulnerabilities that we can find in our systems and 
mobile devices. Some of them are invalidated input, access-control problems, secure storage an 
encryption, insecure file operations, DoS, Bypass. 
In  the follow lines,  we are  going to  explain the vulnerabilities  that  we can  commonly  find in 
Android systems. 
• Unvalidated input: Information from another activity or Intent that it has not been 
validated, before being used by the receiver. Attackers can use these flaws to attack the 
components of our app.
• Acces-control: It is an error due to the lack of enforcement pertaining to users or 
functions that are permitted, or denied, access to an object or a resource. 
• Secure storage and encryption: Is a common vulnerability that occurs when sensitive 
data is not stored securely. Insecure Cryptographic Storage isn’t a single vulnerability, is a 
collection of vulnerabilities. 
• DoS: Attackers can consume mobile phone resources, to achieve the goal of, prevent the normal 
use of the owner's mobile device. Attackers can also steal users accounts or even stop the mobile 
device.
• Bypass: Bypass, in general, means either to go around something by an external route rather than 
going through it. In network security, a bypass is a flaw in a security system that allows an attacker 
18
Figure 5: Android threats
to circumvent security mechanisms to get system or network access.
In conclusion, the security industry must be one step ahead of the hackers. As we see in 
previous graphics Android in under serious threat and may be, if we don't make nothing, Android 
will  disappear drowned by countless threats, malicious apps, malware etc.  But this creates new 
answers from the community, for example the Cloud, which has created an app repository and a 
reputation service, that protects us from malicious or fraudulent apps, avoiding that the download to 
our device. We have too an evaluation by the users, voting the apps, causing the suspicious apps be 
blocked. Furthermore we can use an anti-virus but as we can see in [33] they are useless, because in 
Android, does not exist the typical pc virus, we have a new model of attacks.
 2.5 Summary
In this  chapter  we have  taken a  quick  look to the  Android SO, we have  seen its  main 
components, layers, explaining its main components and how they interact between them. We have 
introduced the vulnerabilities related to Android, explaining why Android is a very threatened and 
vulnerable OS. But what is the next step? Now that we have focused the main threats, and the 
possibles consequences, we have to find the way to avoid and detect such problems. In the next 
chapter  we  will  characterize  and  classify  an  extensive  collection  of  tools,  as  a  result  of  an 
exhaustive search.
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 3 Classification of security tools for Android 
Currently  there  is  a  wide  variety  of  tools  that  help  us  to  evaluate  the  security  of  the 
applications we have installed in our phones or tablets. However, given their heterogeneous nature, 
it is difficult to select which is the most adequate tool for a given system. Unfortunately, to this day 
there is an absence of the tools that can help us in determining the functionalities they offer
This chapter proposes a taxonomy to characterize the purpose of the security tools in the 
domain of Android.
The main features we look for in these tools, which help us in finding vulnerabilities are, 
that is a dynamic tool and allows us to interact with the device that we're looking for vulnerabilities, 
and be able to work with him, is a very important point in our search, to be able to work in real 
time, we are able to do experiments in various contexts and workloads, it  is not the same find 
security flaws in a terminal, in actual use, than with an emulator. The actual device will always be 
more reliable, and we will get real results with an emulator. 
It is also important to have a proper working environment, to make the work easier, we don't 
want to have to be introducing complicated orders, or spend too much time to learn how to use it. It  
is also valuable that already contains predefined orders to allow us to start working immediately, 
since  we are interested in  studying ourselves  immediately,  that  is  our  goal.  Another  feature to 
appreciate is that, the tool has a community that gives us support when we have a problem, or when 
we find a bug, it's always important to have this type of aid to choose one option over another. It is  
also important that the tool in question this regularly updated, with input from other users, such as 
improvements or even with user's new contributions, that are not linked to the project, because our 
experience says that, an application or tool grows faster if you have a large community supporting 
it.
According to their way of working, the tools can be dynamic or static, depending on the type 
of the analysis that they perform of the system. The first, enables an interaction between user and 
system, while the second does not require the system executed nor the user interaction.
According  to  their  deployments,  tools  may  require  the  use  of  additional  hardware  or 
software, or the tools may be executed desolately in devices, may be we need more components to 
start working with the tool.
According to their purpose, we can find tools that just analyse the manifest of the installed 
apps,  we have another’s that decompile the apk packets, we have tools that can draw the logical 
flow of the application, we have applications that searches for atypical patters, we can find tools to 
modify the entire Android system, changing the icons of the battery, the sounds, and much more.
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 3.1 Dynamic tools
In this section we can find two types of security tools,  on the one hand dynamic tools, why 
dynamic? because we can interact with them, we can change the inputs and get different outputs, in 
the other hand we have the static tools, we can not interact with them, we just wait for the results.
 3.1.1 Androguard 
Androguard [7, 12, 16, 20] is programmed in python, is not just a malware 
analysis tool on Android, actually it  is a complete framework that allows us to 
interact directly with malicious code, read their resources, access the code, and even compare 
different threats, find similarities or differences in their methods, classes and resources. It is also 
possible to incorporate all the features of Androguard to make custom scripts in Python to obtain 
all the details in a simply way about a file. 
This framework first available in the project website Androguard, or can be used through 
Santoku[34] distribution,  which includes ans it's  already installed.  In either case,  Androguard 
makes  it  possible  for  security  experts  a  platform  extremely  complex,  useful  for  analysing 
malicious code on mobile platforms. In addition, you can also download the necessary modules 
for inclusion within any personal tool for analysing malware[11, 13] on Android. 
 The reach that this framework provides for the analysis of Android malware is excellent 
and allows a  better  understanding of the threat  as  well  as a better  knowledge of its  internal 
structure and functionalities. In addition, features Androguard file comparison tools, similarity 
search with other known threats[14], visualization capabilities and more. 
The tool is available only for Linux, you can install it in various ways, we can get off the  
binaries and compile them on our own, on the other hand we can install it with the order apt-get 
install and following a few simple steps will have installed in minutes.  Whether you choose an 
option  as  another,  we  have  to  overcome  a  dependency  accounts,  such  as  python  2.6  and 
optionally  if  we  want  all  the  functionality  available  Androguard,  ipython,  pygments  (colour 
code), pyfuzzy (to calculate the risk of the. apk), mercury (to activate andromercury.py) psyco (to 
speed up Androguard). [15]
By default Androguard brings a series of tools and scripts to facilitate the work of the 
analyst and lets you interact in a simple and dynamic threats. One of the most practical options, 
and a good place to start learning about this framework is Androlyze, which allows us to start an 
interactive shell analysis. 
Androguard's analysis is static, as the program runs on a computer with Linux not in the 
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mobile device. This analysis focuses on the apk packages.  We can find more information in the 
Androguard's blog in [10]. In the table 1 we have the main features from Androguad.
Main features 
Format types supported Differences  similarity 
analysis 
Static analysis Support 
APK APK/DEX Flow control graphs Support sessions 
DEX Similarities  between 
methods 
Search  for  packages, 
methods, fields 
Remember orders history 
JAR It  detects  plagiarism 
between apps 
Bytecodes (Dalvik) Comparison  based  on 
compressors
Byte-codes (Java)
Table 1: Androguard's features
 3.1.2 APK-tool
APK-tool[3]  is  a  reverse engineering tool[18],  designed to  analyse third-party 
Android apps. Provides the ability to debug  Smali[19] code step by step. Makes working with 
apps easier,  APK-tool can decode source code to make it very close to the original, and rebuild 
after being modified, you can automate tasks like building, sign, align apks.  It also offers the 
possibility of access to the app resources, such as icons or strings and can change them to need 
and return to recompile the app and install it. The code is available at [9]
Features
• Decode source code (including resources.arsc, XMLs and 9.png) and compile it. 
• APK-tool, give us the option to debug Smali code.
• Give support for repetitive tasks.
• Sign an apk 
APK-tool  is  available  for  Windows,  MacOS  and  Linux,  installation  is  as  easy  as 
unpacking the file  we downloaded and run,  we do no need to  install  additional  packages  or 
dependencies, so just have superuser permissions. 
Apk-tool is a closed tool, we can not change anything, just have available the functionality 
that it offers, just have a series of commands accessible via cmd console or in case of Windows, 
with their respective options. 
It is an open project we can find it in code.google, APK-tool is programmed in Python, we 
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can support the project by downloading the repository on GitHub and we can contribute to the 
project with ours features or ideas.
APK-tool is a static analysis tool, that is restricted to analysing the contents of the package 
apk, running on the computer on which you have installed and not on the mobile device, so we 
don't need a real mobile device, that tool is focused on the analysis of the contents of the  install 
application package.
In the figure 6 we have an example from the available commands from APK-tool, we can 
find decoding orders, with the options from debug mode, decode source, deleting destination 
folder, and installing a framework.
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Figure 6: APK-tool menu
 3.1.3 APK Multi-tool 
Decompiling tool which allows us to decompile the Android apps. 
APK Multi-tool [8] offers a wide range of options supported for simple 
tasks, like, removing a mobile device apk, optimizing images, sign an apk.  It also supports more 
complex tasks, for example, compile part of the apk. Once decompiled the apk packet, you can 
modify the code of the application, although is not recommended because it is in a pseudo-code, it's 
quite difficult to understand if we don't have the suitable knowledge. 
APK  Multi-tool  is  only  available  for  windows,  is  installed  on  your  computer  and  the 
analysis is done from the it, you can access through the command line, and offers a menu from 
which you can use all functionalities. This tool can not be configured, is a closed tool, and we can 
only use the options offered. The analysis of that this tool is static, since its function is centred on 
apk packages, running on the computer and not on the mobile device. 
Developed initially by Daneshm90, the code is not available. 
Features:
• Check apk dependencies. 
• Allows to modifying system apks.
• Apk optimization (Zipalign, OptiPNG) 
• Provide log the events. 
• Quick apk signature. 
• Error detection, checks if errors have occurred while performing a task. 
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• Apks multi installation support. 
At the  figure 7 we can see the APK-Multi  tool  menu,  here we can find all  the offered 
features, as we can see it's very easy to access to the orders, just we have to insert the code, here we  
have too a short explanation of each command.
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Figure 7: APK-Multi tool menu
 3.1.4 Mercury 
Mercury[1,2,4,5,6] is a framework, written in Python and available only for 
Linux, that allows you to explore the Android platform, to find vulnerabilities and 
exploits to share with its developer community. This tool allows you to assume the 
role of a without Android app privileges and interact with other apps and with the system.   It gives 
the user an interface where it can explore the environment of the mobile device, you can access the 
different components of the installed applications. 
Mercury Installation  is  only  available  for  Linux,  is  simple,  we just  have  to  get  off  the 
installation  package,  correct  occasional  dependence  on  Python,  and  have  installed  the  ADB 
(Android Debug Bridge),  once installed,  we just  need to execute a command on the command 
console and we're in Mercury console. 
Mercury comes with a number of predefined modules, which are the main base of resources 
available to the tool, but you can add more modules written for us to meet the needs of the user, we  
can automate tasks by writing a script that uses the orders already defined in Mercury. 
Mercury follows a client-server model, the client is formed by the console that is which 
sends the orders and showing the results on the screen,  and the server that runs on the mobile 
device, so that all the results get real-time, so that we have a tool that performs dynamic analysis. 
Mercury was born of an initiative MWRLabs a security company, the tool is freely available, 
we we can download and use freely. The source code is accessible via a GitHub project. 
 Allows you to add modules and create scripts to add new features. 
Mercury allows you to: 
• Interact  with  the  4  IPC  endpoints-activities,  broadcast  receivers,  content  providers  and 
services 
• Use a proper shell that allows you to play with the underlying Linux OS from the point of 
view of an unprivileged application.
•  Find  information  on installed  packages  with  optional  search  filters  to  allow for  better 
control 
• Built-in commands that can check application attack vectors on installed applications .
• Transfer files between the Android device and your computer 
• Create new modules [6] to exploit your latest finding on Android, and playing with those 
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that others have found.
At the figure 8 we can see the output of the Mercury command ls, here we can find a piece of the 
commands that we can find in Mercury.
Nowadays the Mercury protect is discontinued, the last version is the 2.2, MWR labs has decided to 
change Mercury for Drozer, at the figure 9, we can see the logo from the new MRW-Labs tool.
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Figure 8: Mercury Menu
Figure 9: Drozen logo
 3.1.5 ASEF-Android Security Evaluation Framework  
Android  Security  Evaluation  Framework  (ASEF)[20],  performs  an  analysis  while 
applications are running on your mobile device, alerting us to the problems that may arise.  It can 
can warn us about installed apps that can expose vulnerable components, and can help us find and 
remove suspicious apps to their subsequent verification and removed if necessary.  ASEF works this 
way,  you choose a set of apps already installed or from a apk folder, will be migrated to a virtual 
device (AVD), where they pass a series of tests. 
During the test cycles, the applications are installed on the AVD and are launched. ASEF 
causes certain behaviours by sending random or pre-set gestures and then uninstall the application 
automatically. It can capture logs, network traffic, kernel logs, memory dumps, running processes 
and other parameters at all stages of the life cycle of the app, later all these logs will be used by the 
ASEF  parser.  That  attempt  to  determine  for  example  the  aggressive  use  of  bandwidth,  the 
interactions with any server that uses the API Google Safe Browsing, a permission assignments and 
known security failures.   ASEF can be easily integrate with other open source tools to capture 
sensitive information such as SIM card numbers, phone numbers and other. 
ASEF is only compatible with Linux and MacOS, can not be installed on another operating 
system, is installed on the computer and works with apks folders. We can install it by downloading 
a package, we need to fix some python dependencies, installing certain modules, Getopt :: Std; 
URI :: Find; URI :: Encode, once done already and we can access ASEF. 
ASEF is an open source[21] tool for analysing the security of Android devices.  Users can 
perform basic analysis using the scenarios that come in a default installation, or if you want to 
extract more information you can create or modify other scenarios that already brings the tool,  you 
can even find other patterns of analysis. ASEF provides automated testing by providing a plug and 
play, making it possible to stay updated with the latest developments in the field of apps. 
As we can see at the figure 10, ASEF works like a black box, we can introduce a folder with 
the  apks packages,  that  we want  to  analyse  and ASEF  takes  care  of  everything,  it  self  makes 
analysis to detect malware,  aggressive adware, we don't have to introduce a command or make a 
choice.
28
 3.2 Static tools
Here we have all the tools that not interact with any device, they just are used to 
static analysis,  these tools perform tests of apk packets, analysing for example, the manifest, the 
permissions manifest, or analysing the flow of the application for seek hidden features.
 3.2.1 ComDroid 
ComDroid[16] is an online tool that offers a static analysis of our app, we just need to have 
the apk package and upload it to the ComDroid web and after a brief analysis will show, that it 
allows us to see the apk vulnerabilities, the IPC communications will be emphasized,  and other 
typical faults by errors of the programmer. Relies on a database of patterns vulnerabilities. Android 
supports communication between applications through the use of Intents. Unfortunately, these can 
make your application vulnerable to others.  The content of Intents can be intercepted, modified, 
stolen, or replaced, compromising user privacy. Also, a malicious application can inject false or 
malicious Intens, which can access private user data or violating security policies of the application. 
Comdroid  bases  its  operation  in  search  of  patterns  in  our  code,  running  on  a  remote 
machine,  we assume that decompiles the apk package and analyses, therefore performs a static 
analysis. 
This tool does not require any installation, just we access their website, we just upload our 
apk  package  and  application  and  takes  care  of  analysing  our  code,  after  this,  shows  us  our 
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Figure 10: ASEF diagram
application vulnerabilities. Hence this application does not support any configuration. 
ComDroid has been developed by the University of Berkeley and is freely accessible, we 
have no access to the code, but we do know is that ComDroid is based on the JarJarBinks program 
code.
Unauthorized Intent Receipt 
• Broadcast Theft 
• Activity Hijacking 
• Service Hijacking 
Intent Spoofing 
• Malicious Broadcast Injection 
• Malicious Activity Launch 
• Malicious Service Launch 
 3.2.2 StowAway
StowAway[17] is a static package analysis tool, that analyses our apk manifest, just have to 
upload  our  app  to  their  website,  and  takes  place  a  static  analysis,  returning  a  report  on  the 
permissions requested by the application. It also has a complete map of existing permissions on the 
Android API[22]. 
Certain services of the Android APIs are protected with permissions. To access the API calls, 
you need to  include  these  permissions  in  the  application  manifest.  But  this  can  be  dangerous, 
because if  an app asks for more permissions than they actually need, this is an over-privileged 
application.   It  is  important  to  consider  when  installing  an  application  on  your  device,  which 
permits asks. Common users typically do not consider which permissions an application asks, this 
can be a door to future theft information, and an increased vulnerability of our device.  StowAway 
use automated tools to detect application permissions that analyses, returning a detailed report of 
the analysed application permissions. 
This  tool  not  need any installation,  is  a  service  via  the  Internet,  we need only  connect  to  the 
StowAway website and upload the package you want it to be analysed ,only accepts apk packets and 
after a few minutes we present a report of the analysis. 
 The tools doesn’t accept any configuration because it is a web service, the type of analysis 
that performs this static type tool is because only analyses the apk package manifest also from the 
website assures us that do not stay back our app. This tool is free of charge, is a free service access,  
code itself is not accessible. 
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 At the figure 11 we have an analysis example output:
 3.2.3 Intent Fuzzer
Intent  Fuzzer[23]  is  a  tool  that  can  be  used  on  any  device  using  the  Google  Android 
operating system (OS). Intent Fuzzer is exactly what is seems, which is a fuzzer. It often finds bugs 
that cause the system to crash or performance issues on the device. The tool can either fuzz a single 
component or all components. It works well on Broadcast receivers, and average on Services. For 
Activities, only single Activities can be fuzzed, not all them. Instrumentations can also be started 
using this interface, and content providers are listed, but are not an Intent based IPC mechanism. 
This tool is only compatible with Android systems, that is mobile phones and tablets, but 
you can use it in the Android simulator. IntentFuzzer package is installed like any apk,  analysis is  
dynamic, as it runs on the mobile device and in real time,  since the test is performed while the 
device is running other tasks, so that the analysis can be influenced by the set of tasks that are 
running while the analysis. 
IntentFuzzer supports some configuration, we can choose what kind of Intents are launched, 
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Figure 11:  Analysis example
we  can  launch  activities,  broadcasts,  providers,  services  or  instrumentations,  having  chosen  a 
category, we can choose specifically that activity, service etc, we want to launch the Intent. 
Intent Fuzzer is freely available but the source code is not provided, but this is also easily 
accessible using the right tools. 
At the figure 12 we have the Intent Fuzzer application's overview, at the left side we have 
the initial menu, here we can choose the type and the component, we can choose to launch a series 
of malformed intents or a single intent,  at the right side we have the output of a single intent.
 3.2.4 Intent Sniffer
Intent Sniffer is a tool that can be used on any device using the Google Android operating 
system (OS). On the Android OS, an Intent is description of an action to be performed, such as 
startService()  to  start  a  service.  The Intent  Sniffer  tool  performs monitoring  of  runtime routed 
broadcasts Intents. It does not see explicit broadcast Intents, but defaults to (mostly) unprivileged 
broadcasts.  There is  an option to see recent tasks Intents,  as activity's  Intents are  visible when 
started and we can capture it and analyse aftherwards. The tool can also dynamically update. 
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Figure 12:: Intent fuzzer overview
Intent Sniffer is installed like any app, can be installed on any Android mobile device you 
have, does not need more to run. Supports certain level of configuration, you can choose what type 
of Inten can show on screen, performing a filter. 
It makes a dynamic analysis, as this takes place while the other activities are running, so it  
may be that this is influenced by the environment in which the device is running so the analysis can 
be different even with the same mobile device. 
ISEC Partners distributes freely this program, we should simply go to their website and 
download the apk package and install it, the code is not distributed, but is easily accessible. 
At the  figure 13,  we have the output  of an analysis,  here we have selected to sniff  the 
activities and the broadcasts and below of the refresh button we have the output of the sniffed 
activities and broadcasts. 
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Figure 13: Overview 
 3.3 Tools summary
Here we have the tools summary table(table 2), here we have the main characteristics of the 
previous tools, we will comment some of them. On the left column we have the main features that 
we have considered the most important. The  OS it's important because we don't have the same 
features in Windows, more restrictive than Linux, we prefer the last one because we can modify 
more parameter, in the offered tools we have more working on Linux than in Windows, and finally 
our  computer  will  work better  in  Linux than in  windows,  when we perform the  analysis.  The 
available  code is  a  good  characteristic,  because  if  we  have  it,  we  can  adapt  the  tool  to  our 
necessities. The free access to the tool is important,  because a free tool is always more accessible 
than a privative tool, we are not going to buy a tool just to test it, simply we proceed to the next . 
The support is an important point to consider, because if we have a problem we can have de help of  
the  tool  forum  or  the  mailing  list.   The  automating  tasks it's  important,  to  be  able  to  find 
vulnerabilities automatically,  that  feature is  important  if  we have a  large number of devices  to 
analyse.  The need of a device it may be necessary but no essential, but its better if we have a real 
environment to make the tests, although is valuable if we can make the tests in an emulator, because 
the different versions of Android are more accessible.
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Characteristics Intent Fuzzer Intent
Sniffer
Manifest
Explorer
Mercury APK-tool APK
Multitool
Androguard Comdroid
OS Android Android Android Linux Linux Windows Html Html
Emulator 
compatible
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Code available ✔ Github ✔ Github ✔ Github ✔ Github ✔ 
code.google
✔ 
code.google
Free ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Support ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Where is installed Mobile Mobile Mobile Pc Pc Pc Pc N/A
Type Static Static Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Dynamic Static
Interact with 
device 
✔ ✔ ✔
Written in Java Java Java Python Python ? Python ?
Find vulnerabilities ✔ ✔
SQL Injection ✔
Needs a device ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Compile, 
de-compile
✔ ✔ ✔
Automating tasks ✔ scripts
Table 2: Tool's summary
 3.4 Why we choose Mercury 
In this paragraph we will explain the election of the best tools for us, with that tool we will 
make the later analysis that we will explain in next chapters. We chose Mercury tool, because it is 
the most complete that, we have found from all we have been discussing, one of the most important 
features and that finally we decided on Mercury, is because Mercury is the only tool that allows us 
to work in real time with mobile devices such as tablets, mobile phones, etc. Therefore it's to work 
with the physical devices and obtain more realistic measures, with devices which are used in real 
life. Another feature which has made us decide for the option of Mercury is that this tool is in 
constant development (or it was in development, while we were carrying out that experience) since 
Mercury is part of a project, about security on mobile devices with the Android operating system. 
Also of note that Mercury has a whole community behind which supports the tool, through forums 
and emails. But Mercury is still  in development, and some of their  features are not completely 
finished, for example the intents orders are not completed and we can't launch them with all of 
35
parameter types.
 3.5 Summary
In this chapter we have explained the differences between a dynamic and static tool. We 
have took a look to several tools that can help us to discover new vulnerabilities and find the know 
ones, how to test potential malicious apps, see the real permissions that a app requires and much 
more. We have explained the most important features of each tool that we have analysed and we 
have put all together in a comparing table, and at last we have justified the choice of Mercury as the  
tool to develop of that Master Thesis.
At the present day we can't find many tools that help us to find, my be because Android is 
still too new, and the people not greatly concerned about their mobile security, but we can find some 
initiatives that are starting to develop few tools to help us to find the weakness of our devices.  But 
these tools do not cover all areas that, we are looking for, so if we want to make a complete analysis  
we will need to combine some of them, because if we only focus on one tool we will not cover all  
the areas. The characteristics we look for in these tools are, that it will be based on Linux, because  
Android is a Linux based system. That we can use a device or an emulator, because it's so important 
for us that we can work with on a real environment, to find real vulnerabilities. It can be important 
if we can add our requirements, adding additional modules, we will adapt the tool to our needs. 
Although the cost of the tool is important, a non-payment may facilitate the diffusion and extending 
more easily.  It's very important for a tool to have behind a community, because we can enlist the 
help of this people to fix problems or propose new features. It's very important that we can interact 
with the device, because not all devices behave the same way.
At this point, we have it's clear for us that we Android is a vulnerable system, that need a 
tools to discover the threats, we have the chosen tool that will help us to carry out our job, but 
what's next? In the next chapter, we will explain the methodology that we follow to standardize the 
vulnerabilities search, because we need an efficient an an easy way to find them and the weakness 
of our mobile device,  we need to define the steps to follow, for don't forget anything through all of  
the phases, in this way we will not forget anything.
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 4 Methodology supported by Mercury
This  chapter  presents  a  methodology  to  systematise  the  configuration,  execution  and 
analysis of experiments top detect vulnerabilities in Android. For this purpose of this master's thesis 
our methodology has been instantiated on Mercury.
 4.1 Common attack injection methodology
In this section we will explain shortly the main attacks performed in ours analysis.  We have 
to explain, that, for develop an analysis, we have to follow three steps:
• Search for the potentials injection points, commonly know as attack surface[40] , once that 
we know the target vulnerable entries, we can start with the injection planning.
• Injection the selected attack, on the previous vulnerable entry target.
• Once the attack is running or has ended, we have to monitor the output, of the attacked 
device. Sometimes, the information what we get is confusing, so we need to format, to make 
easier the reading.
 4.2 Attacks supported by Mercury 
At this sub-chapteer we will explain the steps to preform an attack, we will see how to get 
information, how we can use that information against that app, and what we can expect from that 
attack, all of these steps are common for all attacks.
 4.2.1 Malformed Intents
For the Intents launch, we have to locate the path of the exported activity, for example, 
com.android.browser, the second is to know if that Intent accepts fields, for example,  --data-uri  
web www.upv.es, it's important too to know the type of these fields, because it can be, that a field is 
a String or an Integer, we can know that if we are the programmer of the activity or we have the 
documentation of the application, if not, it can be a hard problem, to discover that. So we have 
focused on well know apps, like browser, search or similar.  We have to emphasize that Mercury is a 
tool that is still in development, and we don't have access to all of the features. In these fields we 
have  made changes,  for  example  inserting  an  Integer  in  a  String  field  or  vice  versa,  we have 
inserted long numbers, negative numbers, large and short values, we have launched Intents with 
empty fields, etc.
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 4.2.1.1 Surface attack
 First we have to get information about the target app.  At the figure 14 we have the exported 
modules at the package com.android.browser, we can see the exported components by the activity, 
we  can  read  that,  it  haves  six,  BrowserAcvity,  ShortcutActivity,  BrowserPreferencesPage, 
BookmarkSearch,  AddBookmarkPage  and  Widged.BookmarkWidegtConfigure.  We  can  send 
intents  to  these components  to  launch activities,  and we can send parameters  too,  and test  the 
activity. Unfortunately, we can't know, which fields the activity waits for, if that activity is not ours, 
or we don't have the documentation.
 4.2.1.2 Injections
We can launch explicit intents or implicit intents, as we can see at the figure 15
At the following point we have an example of intent launch.
• --flags ACTIVITY_NEW_TASK: here we introduce the parameters, we can introduce more 
than  one,  another  examples  of  parameters,  --data-uri  "tel:123",  --extra  string  search 
"searchedword"
Due to the impossibility to know which fields an activity expects, if that application is not 
public or if we don't have the documentation, we have to keep to the public Intents[46], because the 
optional fields are well known. Or this reason we can't test market's app, we would like to test, for  
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Figure 14: Exported activities
Figure 15: Implicit and explicit
example the top 10 downloaded apps, but due to this reason, we coudn't.
Here we will show some of the test that we have launched with Mercury:
run app.activity.start --action android.intent.action.SEARCH --flags ACTIVITY_NEW_TASK
First we are going to explain the order:
• app.activity.start: That is the Mercury order to launch intents
• --action: that indicate that the following string it's the exported module to which we will 
launch the intent.
The next  step,  is  to  launch a  series  of  intents  to  a  determined activities,  modifying the 
parameter, like change the type, sending large values, etc and expecting the results.
Due to the Mercury's limitations and the impossibility of know the parameters of the private 
applications  we had  to  follow to  the  Android's  developers  Intent  classification  page,  for  these 
reasons we have obtained few results. We have to explain, that Mercury is a tool in continuous 
development and still is not finished, for this reason, Mercury is not full developed and we don't 
have access to all of the features that we need, for example we can't use all of the types in the intent  
fields.
 4.2.1.3 Observable output
With the  malformed intents  we can  expect  an  abnormal  behaviour  form the  target  app, 
maybe because the programmer of that app, doesn't check the fields. We can see an abort of the 
target  app.  In  resume we have to  wait  the  answer of  the target  app,  to  our  malformed intents  
injection. At the figure 16 we can see an example of bad response to a malformed intent.
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Figure 16: Force close
 4.2.2 Broadcasts
Here  due  to  the  lack  of  information  about  the  exported  broadcasts  launchers  and  the 
broadcasts listeners, we have to adjust to the well know broadcasts, like the system broadcasts. In 
that case we have to know the Intent and the fields that accepts and the type, (if any), once that we 
have that data, we just have to launch broadcasts changing the content of the fields and introducing 
wrong data in these fields, changing the type of them, wrong values, once we have launch the 
broadcasts, we have to wait to the mobile device behaviour, some times we have an output, because 
any application is waiting for that broadcast other times we don't have any response, because no 
application is listening for that broadcast.
 4.2.2.1 Attack surface
We have to adjust  to the system broadcasts(we have made a classification from them at 
annex),  because  we  can't  know  the  broadcasts  that  an  app  waits  for,  unless  we  have  the 
documentation of the app, and the fields (if any) that an app waits for, so for the cause we have 
adjusted to the system defined broadcasts. So we have adjusted to the Android developers broadcast 
table. At the figure 17 we can see that the sieve app, it doesn't have a broadcast. This is a way to 
know,  which  applications  have  broadcasts,  but  we  can't  know  how  do  they  work.
Figure 17: Providers search
 4.2.2.2 Injections
We have launched a  series  of  system broadcasts,   It's  so  difficult  to  know what  is  the 
influence of a broadcast in an app, may be it's not affected, or may be the application stops their 
work, but is so difficult to know that, if we don't have the app documentation. For this purpose we 
have programmed a simple app, that reply only to a broadcast that we have registered, the response 
of our app, is just a message shown at the device screen. At the following line we have an example  
of one broadcast launch.
mercury> run app.broadcast.send  --action  com.upv.intento   --extra  string  parameter  "string  to  
display" 
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 4.2.2.3 Observable output
Due to the nature of the broadcasts, it's very complicated to know, if any app is waiting for 
that broadcast, and if our launched broadcast affects nay app, at the  figure 18 here we have an 
example  of  a  broadcasts  launch  response.  May  be  an  app  waits  for  a  specific  broadcasts  to  
disconnect himself from the internet, to consume less battery, but it's very difficult to know if an 
app has changed his behaviour duo to a broadcast.
Figure 18: Broadcast response
41
 4.2.3 SQL Injection
For that type of attack first we have to know if we have vulnerable content providers, this is 
an easy task, Mercury can do al the work, one we know the vulnerable content providers only 
remains  to  launch the  SQL injection,  if  they  are vulnerable  we can ask to  the table  about  the 
information, we can know the orders that made the table and the type of the fields. Test the content 
providers is easy just typing the SQL query, but we can also, insert into the table, and we can test 
the consistency of the table introducing wrong types into the table, unfortunately we can't test all the 
features due to Mercury development.
 4.2.3.1 Attack surface
To test a Content provider must first explore whether there are and how they are configured, 
Mercury offers us an interesting tool, Webcontentresolver, this starts a service on port 8080 in our 
own machine, which offers a complete listing of all Content Providers of our device.
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Figure 19: Web content resolver
At the figure 19, we can see a the Webcontentresolver list of content providers installed in 
our device, we can see their authority and their permissions (R / W,)  we are looking for content 
providers, having either or both permits R/ W to null, allowing us to interrogate the database and 
write on it. For this same information can also use the order, scanner.provider. injection, and 
Mercury will return a list of Content providers vulnerable to SQL injection, here an example of a 
Samsung mobile:
At the  figure 20 we have the output of the vulnerable content  providers command, that 
command  searches  in  all  the  providers  the  vulnerable  ones,  looking  for  the  read  and  write 
permissions set to null.
43
Figure 20: vulnerable contents provider
 4.2.3.2 Injections
Once we have Content providers vulnerable, we can test them, here an example:
run app.provider.query content://telephony/carriers/preferapn --vertical
and in the table 3 we have the results of the previous order:
_id 71
name Yoigo
Numeric 21404
mcc 214
mnc 04
apn internet
user null
User null
server null
password null
proxy 010.008.000.036
port 8080
mmsproxy null
mmsport null
mmsc null
authtype -1
type Default, supl
current 1
Protocol IP
roaming_protocol IP
carrier_enabled 1
bearer 0
Table 3: Results 
Here we can  find a  table  with multiple  fields,  _id  (this  field is  common on all  tables),  name, 
numeric, user and much more, we can find that the last sim card was from Yoigo.
We can know too, internal information of the table, as the SQL statements that created it, the type of 
fields:
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mercury> run app.provider.query content://telephony/carriers/preferapn --projection "* from 
sqlite_master--" --vertical 
    type  table 
    name  android_metadata 
tbl_name  android_metadata 
rootpage  3 
     sql  CREATE TABLE android_metadata (locale TEXT) 
    type  table 
    name  carriers 
tbl_name  carriers 
rootpage  4 
     sql  CREATE TABLE carriers(_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,name TEXT,numeric TEXT,mcc 
TEXT,mnc TEXT,apn TEXT,user TEXT,server TEXT,password TEXT,proxy TEXT,port 
TEXT,mmsproxy TEXT,mmsport TEXT,mmsc TEXT,authtype INTEGER,type TEXT,current 
INTEGER,protocol TEXT,roaming_protocol TEXT,carrier_enabled BOOLEAN,bearer INTEGER)
So far, we have obtained information from the contents of the table, we extracted additional 
information from the table, what's left? trying to insert data into the table, let's see. We will insert 
information into the content provider //com.cyanogenmod.cmparts.provider.Settings/settings
mercury> run app.provider.insert content://com.cyanogenmod.cmparts.provider.Settings/settings 
--integer _id 1 --string key nth --integer value 10 
In the above order, we have to indicate the full address of the content provider, we also have 
to indicate the names of the fields, their type and value, then we execute the order and if Mercury 
responds with done, it means that the insertion was successful.
mercury> run app.provider.query content://com.cyanogenmod.cmparts.provider.Settings/settings 
| _id | key | value | 
| 1   | nth | 10    |
In the above command we can see that the information is properly inserted.
After these experiments, we can see that we can access sensitive information, this app is 
capable without having any special permission to access all content providers that are not properly 
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configured, we must to remember that Mercury only requires the Intnernet permission.
 4.2.3.3 Observable output
Here we can observe the access to the data base, we can see the content of the tables that store the 
information of the app, may be that information it can be sensitive, for example we can access to a 
password organizer, or to our emails. At the figure 21 we can see an example of output from a SQL 
injection.
46
Figure 21: SQL output example
 4.2.4 Command Execution
In this attack we only can launch a shell or a single command, here we can test all the 
command that Busybox offers, so we can test the access to the file-system directory, try to copy 
files and modify them with the vi or vim program, offered by Busybox. We can test the access to 
secure folders like /etc, /mnt, access to the SD card (if any).
 4.2.4.1 Attack surface
We have to explain first that, if we want to launch commands like in a normal Linux OS, 
first we have to install the Busybox, because we will launch the orders that Busybox allows us, we 
don't need anything more, we don't need to find nothing, but with Mercury we can install BussyBox 
without the permission of the user, just we have to put a simple order like that:
Mercury> run tools.setup.busybox 
And the user will never know that we have installed a new application on her mobile device, so yes 
it's possible to install an app with the knowledge of the user, a disturbing fact
 4.2.4.2 Injections
We can open a shell through Mercury and we can navigate across the file-system, as we can see on 
the below figure we can reach the mnt/ file, for example we can copy all the content of that folder to 
a local path.  We have an example at the figure 22, here we can see the output of a ls order.
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Figure 22: Launching a shell
 4.2.4.3 Observable output
As a result of an vi command, we can see the content of the files, here we have an example 
from the boot.txt as we can see at the figure 23.
The most striking is the ease with which we can access the system and start throwing orders 
as if we were in a normal system, we don't have to forget that we are in a mobile device,  and we are 
subject to Busybox availability.  
 4.3 Summary
In that chapter we have explained the sequence of steps to find vulnerabilities in an Android 
mobile device, we have explained in a simply way, the main vulnerabilities, the attack types that we 
will use in following steps, we have seen the configuration of the experiments. We have explained 
how  to  make  the  attacks,  we  have  seen  some  examples  and  a  few  screen  captures  from the 
Mercury's output. In the next chapter we will explain the case of study, the target mobile devices,  
we will explain more deeply the attacks.
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Figure 23: Content of the file boot.txt
 5 Case study
In this chapter we are going to explain how we did the experiments that, we have been 
developed,  defining  the  targets  devices,  the  experiment  objectives,  how  we  developed  the 
experiments and the measures. 
In this case, we will develop or experiences on a Linux environment, specifically in Ubuntu 
12.10, but it also could be done in MacOS and Windows. We will use the Mercury version 2.2.1.
To prepare the experiment, first we have to prepare the working environment. We must first 
have a device that can launch the experiments, we can ask whether working in a real or emulated, 
for the first option we should have available any phone, better if is a real device, we will get better 
results.  We  can  help  with  the  emulator,  if  we  install  the  Android  Software  Development  Kit 
(Android SDK), with this tool we can create virtual devices with any version of Android. With the 
emulator gives us great versatility in being able to choose which version to realize. We can choose 
the emulator, it's a safe environment if we use unsafe or malicious apps and if anything goes wrong 
we can return to safe. But we have few cons, sometimes is very slow and is not an example of 
device that we can find in the real world. On the other hand, we can choose a real device, is faster 
and easy to monitor, we have a real usage example and we have full control if the device is rooted, 
but it can be damaged if we test malicious apps. We will choose the real device, because we have at 
our grasp, several devices, so we will use them.
We should install Mercury, in our computer, is simple, we just get off their latest version and 
follow some easy steps, additionally, for Mercury's correctly work we need to install Python. In 
addition we have to install the agent (the client) in our target mobile device, is as easy as install a 
normal app, we can do it thought the ADB. Before connect Mercury to the agent, we have to start it.  
Once installed all the need, simply we have to type in a terminal mercury console connect. 
We have a couple of models of connection between the client(Mercury app, con the mobile 
device) and the server(Mercury on the computer), we can connect via USB or via WIFI, we have 
decided for the first option, via USB, is much faster and requires less infrastructure to run.
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 5.1 Target Devices
For our tests we have used several devices, in the table 4, we can see them, including mobile 
phones and tablets. We have tested two HTC WildFire A3333, one Samsung Galaxy S and two 
Archos 7o internet tablet, 
Brand Model Operative System Version
HTC WildFire A3333 Android - HTC Sense 2.1 Model A
HTC WildFire A3333 Cyanogen Mod 7.2 Model B
Samsung Galaxy S Cyanogen Mod 9.2 Model C
Archos 7o Internet Tablet Android 2.2.1 2.4.8.3 Model D
Archos 7o Internet Tablet Android 2.2.1 2.4.8.1 Model E
Table 4: target devices
 5.2 Work load
Here we are going to explain the work load, the installed apps, services, and the overall info about 
the target mobile.
• Archos versions 2.4.8.1 and 2.4.8.3,  installed apps:
◦ Adobe reader, Aldiko, Angry birds, AppsLibs, calculadora, Búsqueda de google, cámara, 
CineShowTime,  ColorNote,  Deezer,  eBuddy,  FindYourWay,  Fring,  Galeria, 
HubkapMobile,  Música,  navegador,  Quiclpedia,  Relog,  Skype,  Touteur, 
ViewPageIndicator, Youtube,  contactos.
• HTC house Rom: 
◦ Adobe reader, Aldiko, BusyBox,  calculadora, cámara, carHome, descargas, DevTools, 
DroidSheep,  DSPManager,  email,  filemanager,  gamería,  ManifestExplorer,  sms, 
MercuryAgent,  Música,  navegador,  noticias,  playStore,  radioFM,  torch,  videos, 
superuser, TestGCM,  contactos.
• HTC Cyanogen V7:
◦ Galeria,  contactos,  SMS,  Mensajes,  Música,  mercuryAgent,  radioFM,  videos,  torch, 
BusyBox,  noticias,   DSPManager,   playStore,   MovieStudio,   taskManager,   Shark, 
filemanager,  TestGCM,  ViewPageIndicator
• Samsung Cyanogen V9:
◦ Ajustes, Boox, Búsqueda, calculadora, calendario, cámara, contactos, correo, descargas, 
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DevTools,  drone,  DSPmanager,  Eventivities,  Findme,  galeria,  Gmail,  geoEvents, 
Hikinapp,  mercuryAgent,  Mensajes,  MovieStudio,  Música,  navigation,  PepeRoutes, 
PersonalFinance,  PlayStore,  Principal,  Relog,  Shark,  taskManager,  Shamir,  Shark, 
superuser, valenparty, Youtube.
 5.3 Experiments configuration
Here we are going to explain our experiments in numbers:
Experiments done:
Fault Nº of injections Positive results
Malformed intents 75 54
Broadcasts 50 43
SQL Injections 45 30
Command 30 23
 5.3.1 Relevant parameters
Here we will explain the most relevant parameters that we have introduced in our injections
• Malformed intents  :  
▪ Integers:  Empty  fields,   out  of  range  (like  one  million),  negative,  malformed 
numbers, numbers with letters, numbers with punctuation marks.
▪ Strings:  Empty fields, strings with numbers, strings with capital letters, strings with 
spaces, strings with punctuation marks, long strings, 
• Broadcasts  : we have introduced, wrong uris, wrong paths, we have inserted in the optional 
fields unexpected parameters, like empty fields, malformed strings and integers.
• SQL Injections  : we have inserted malformed parameters, like wrong integers, malformed 
strings, very similar to the malformed entry.
• Command  : Here is impossible to insert parameters.
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 5.4 Results
In this chapter we are going to introduce the results that we have found in our experiments. 
Results  are  obtained  from  performing  200  experiments,  and  from  these,  in  150  we  found 
vulnerabilities. As we will present, the most vulnerable devices are those which have installed a 
cooked Roms like Cyanogen [42]. If we install a modified rom,  we have more possibilities adapt 
our mobile device to ours requirement,  but the more possibilities we have to modify, the more 
vulnerable our mobile will be. The most surprising vulnerability was found in Archos devices, we 
found that  the OS answer to  the CALL an DIAL Intents,  when the Archos devices  are  tablets 
without dial options, they are not phones. Following the advices of Android developers, we have 
explained some advices to avoid some of the vulnerabilities exposed in the previous chapters. But 
we have to emphasize that no all of the vulnerabilities are avoidable. 
Most software security vulnerabilities fall into one of a small set of categories:
• Invalidated input.
• access-control problems.
• Secure Storage and Encryption.
• Insecure File Operations.
• DoS.
• Bypass.
But, we will classify then in four categories, malformed intent, broadcasts, SQL Injection 
and command execution. 
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 5.4.1 Malformed Intents
Here we will introduce the fails that we have observed when we launched the malformed 
intents. At the table 5, we have the access-control and invalidated input vulnerabilities.
Device models DELETE(1) WEB_SEARCH (2) SEARCH(3)
Model A
Model B ✔ ✔ ✔
Model C ✔ ✔ ✔
Model D
Model E
Table 5: Malformed Intents
Delete: an activity action, we can delete de given data from its container. Input required. 
Web_search: an activity action, action required to perform a web search. Input required.
Search: an activity action, perform a search. Input required.
(1) We were able to crash, the delete feature when we didn't insert any string in the target field.
(2)  We  stop  the  execution  of  the  de  Google  Search  when  we  launch  the  system  call 
WEB_SEARCH.
(3) We were able to stop, the search function, when we didn't insert anything to search, because we 
suppose, that field is necessary.
Here  we face  to  a  system problem,  because  we were  able  to  access  to  a  some system 
features,  like  Delete,  Web search,  search,  is  supposedly we could not be able to access to that 
functionalities so we have an  access-control  problems, but we can access to them, may be the 
system doest not check the id of the process that launch that calls, or these features are not market  
like only-system-access. We have too, an invalidated input  problem, because that features doesn’t 
check the fields that the intent call pass, we can have a string in a field that supposedly it must be an 
integer. It can be very difficult to know the source of these problems.
We can exploit these vulnerabilities, leaving empty the required fields or inserting the wrong 
type, we can stop that feature or may be, depending on the Android OS, we can reboot the system,  
reaching a DOS (denial of service), so that vulnerabilities can be very harmful for the user, because 
it's impossible to see why that is happening, is transparent.
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 5.4.2 Broadcasts
In the table 6, we have the access to System Broadcasts, in the first row we have the tested 
broadcasts that supposedly are only accessible by the OS. Here mainly, we have the access-control 
the DOS and the ByPass vulnerabilities.
Device
models
DREAMING 
STARTED
(2)
DREAMING 
STOPPED
(2)
EXTERNAL 
APPLICATIONS
AVAILABLE(1)
(2)
PACKAGE 
FIRST
LAUNCH
(2)
PACKAGE
VERIFIED
(2)
MANAGE 
NETWORK
USAGE
(2)
POWER
USAGE
SUMMARY
(2)
MY 
PACKAGE
REPLACED
(2)
(*)
Model 
A
✔
Model 
B
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Model 
C
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Model 
D(**)
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Model 
E(**)
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Table 6: Access control problems
DREAMING_STARTED: Broadcast Action, Sent after the system starts dreaming. 
DREAMING_STOPPED: Broadcast Action, Sent after the system stops dreaming. 
EXTERNAL  _APPLICATIONS_AVAILABLE:  Broadcast  Action:,Resources  for  a  set  of 
packages (which were previously unavailable) are currently available since the media on which they 
exist is available. 
PACKAGE_FIRST_LAUNCH: Broadcast Action, Sent to the installer package of an application 
when that application is first launched (that is the first time it is moved out of the stopped state). 
The data contains the name of the package. 
PACKAGE_VERIFIED: Broadcast Action, Sent to the system package verifier when a package is 
verified. The data contains the package URI. 
MANAGE_NETWORK_USAGE:  Activity  Action,  Show settings  for  managing  network  data 
usage of a specific application. Applications should define an activity that offers options to control 
data usage. 
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POWER_USAGE_SUMMARY: Activity Action, Show power usage information to the user. 
MY_PACKAGE_REPLACED:  Broadcast Action,  A new version of your application has been 
installed over an existing one. This is only sent to the application that was replaced. It does not 
contain any additional data; to receive it, just use an intent filter for this action. 
(*) Access control vulnerability access to non specific functionality of the application DIAL 
(**)We found too, that the Archos models answer to the CALL and DIAL broadcast, when these 
models don't have the phone options. 
(1)  Deny of service when we launch the broadcast EXTERNAL_APPLICATIONS_AVAILABLE 
we stop the apps Trebuchet[47] and Google Play.
(2) With these attacks, we didn’t get any remarkable response, just we were able to launch that OS 
broadcasts.
Here we have the broadcasts that, supposedly are accessible only by the OS, we can see a 
ByPass vulnerability, so we found that many of these broadcasts that are accessible by any app,  this 
discovery is disturbing, because this an Operative System fail, is not a vulnerability inserted by a 
programmer mistake or oversight, is an error from the own system, so the problem is worst than we 
thought. We can exploit, mainly that vulnerability, sending a series of broadcasts hoping to change 
the behaviour of the applications, that, are currently running in the system, some of them, will not  
take care of these broadcasts, but others will be listening and waiting for that broadcast, and will 
change their performance. Unfortunately we can't make anything against that problem, the origin of 
this is in the own system we hope, that problem will be solved in coming versions of Android.
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 5.4.3 SQL Injection
At the table 7, we have the content providers unauthorized access vulnerabilities and Secure 
Storage and Encryption vulnerabilities, at the first row we have the content providers that we were 
able to access, extract and modify information.
Models Apn
provider
(1)
Settings
provider
(1)
phone 
contacts
(1)
com.google.
settings/
partner
(1)
control 
device 
secret codes
(1)
com.google.
android.maps.
LayerInfo
Provider 
(1)
com.android.
cm.mms
(1)(2)
com.android.
cm.
mms/templates
(1)(2)
Model 
A
✔ ✔ ✔
Model 
B
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Model 
C
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Model 
D
✔ ✔ ✔
Model 
E
✔ ✔ ✔
Table 7: Secure storage and encryption
Apn provider:  Is  the name of  the  gateway between the 3G, etc.  mobile  network and another 
computer network.
Settings provider: Here we can find the configuration of the 3G network, we can find, the name of 
the providers and several settings, (frequency, channel, etc.).
Phone contacts: The stored contacts on our mobile device.
com.google.settings/partner: Here we can find information about the settings from google 
applications, like the mail or similar.
Control device secret codes:   Here we can find the factory secret codes, to access, for example, 
Wireless LAN tests, System dump mode, Immediate backup of all media files, etc. 
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com.google.android.maps.LayerInfoProvider:  We have all the information about the given layer 
from Google Maps.
com.android.cm.mms: The mms, (multi-media messages), stored in our mobile phone.
com.android.cm.mms/templates: The mms templates stored in our mobile phone.
(1)  We were able to access to the content of the tables, and to the SQL instructions to build the 
table.
(2) We were able to read and write on the content provider.
Here we have the content providers (similar to a table, from a database) that, are vulnerable 
to the access to their own data, we have to clear up that, an application can access to their own 
content providers or the content providers from others applications that have authorized it, but here 
we have that we are able to access, nearly to all of the content providers that have some mistakes on 
their  configuration,  if  we don't  want  to  make that  mistake,  we have  to  configure  correctly  the 
content  provider  permissions,  in  particular,  write  and  read,  if  we  don't  make  anything,  these 
permissions will be set at null, and that is our gate to access to the contents. We can read and/or 
write, depending on the condition of the previous permissions. This is a big fail, mainly, from the 
programmers, sometimes they forget to set that parameters, with that mistake we are able to access 
to the data of others applications, may be, the mail, the sms, or the configuration of the wireless 
network, and of course, we can write too, we can insert new information on the content providers, 
we  can  test  the  integrity  of  the  tables,  because  we  can  insert  incorrect  data,  and  monitor  the 
behaviour of the applications when that access to that corrupt data, and perhaps, we can stop the 
application or restart the mobile device, or left the table in a weak state.
57
 5.4.4 Command execution
In the table 8 we have the access to file-system and b  ypass   vulnerabilities, we were able to 
access to the whole SDcard file-system and to the device file-system and we were able to open a 
console on the target device.
Models Total access to the SDcard 
file system
Access to the device file system Code Execution (*)
Model A ✔ ✔ ✔
Model B ✔ ✔ ✔
Model C ✔ ✔ ✔
Model D ✔ ✔ ✔
Model E ✔ ✔ ✔
Table 8: Insecure file operations
(*) Code execution through the BusyBox app[71].
Through the busy box application we can access, almost, to the mail features of a Unix 
systems, like the most orders that we can find in a Linux command console. What will can do, if we 
can deploy all of these commands in an Android device (we don't have to forget, that is based on 
Linux), for example we can list the file-system directories or we can access to the SD-Card (if any) 
and we can copy that contents to our computer or send it thought Internet. We can extract the whole 
path to  the file  that  we want  to  extract  and with the Mercury order  of  copy files and we can 
download wherever we want.
First we have to say that,  we are able to launch commands or launch because we have 
installed the Busy box app, that offers us all, almost, all features of a Unix system. We have to 
focus, that the system allows us to commands like in a computer, we know that Android runs over a 
Linux systems, but we are not in a computer, we are in a mobile device, we supposedly we could  
not access to some features, like list a system folder or see and modify systems files, we just a 
modify one of these files and turn the mobile device into an expensive brick.
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 5.4.5 Curious data
We have found some curious data in our experiments, we will show them here:
• In the Archos Internet tablets we found that the system allows us to launch a system 
broadcasts, like android.intent.action.DREAMING_STOPPED, 
android.intent.action.PACKAGE_FIRST_LAUNCH, 
android.intent.action.CKAGE_FULLY_REMOVED and 
android.intent.action.PACKAGE_VERIFIED, 
• In the Archos Internet tablets, we found that the system allows us to launch 
ndroid.intent.action.NEW_OUTGOING_CALL, despite of that tables not have the function 
of call, we can't make a phone call at all.
• In the Samsung mobile, we have the same case as above, the system allows us to launch a 
system broadcasts, like android.intent.action.DREAMING_STOPPED, 
android.intent.action.PACKAGE_FIRST_LAUNCH, 
android.intent.action.CKAGE_FULLY_REMOVED and 
android.intent.action.PACKAGE_VERIFIED
• In Samsung launching the broadcast 
android.intent.action.EXTERNAL_APPLICATIONS_AVAILABLE, we sopped the apps, 
Trebuchet and Google Play.
• In Samsung mobile, we stopped the Google search launching the 
android.intent.action.WEB_SEARCH, without estra and with, 
android.intent.action.WEB_SEARCH --flags ACTIVITY_NEW_TASK --extra string search 
"wordtosearch"
• In Samsung mobile, we can reboot the mobile inserting the manufacturer code in the dial, as 
follows  *#*#947322243*#*#
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• In Samsung mobile if we introduce the manufacturer code *#*#4636*#*#  in the dial, we 
can know the user and password from the connected wireless network as we can see at the 
figure 24.
Figure 24: User network 
information
• In both HTC mobiles we found the same response to the launch of the 
system.broadcastsandroid.intent.action.DREAMING_STOPPED, 
android.intent.action.PACKAGE_FIRST_LAUNCH, 
android.intent.action.CKAGE_FULLY_REMOVED and 
android.intent.action.PACKAGE_VERIFIED, the system alows us to launche them.
• In both HTC, have ben able to insert data in the content provider 
media/external/images/media/,  this is a table that contains images, when we insert a new 
row in the table, that query needs a photo, so we didn't insert a real photo in the query, but 
the system inserted an empty photo, with a size of 0 Kb.
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 6 Tips and tricks 
In this chapter we will explain some tips a tricks[41] to make safer our application, just 
following these advices we will improve the security of our mobile device.
Android has some security features included into the operating system, that significantly 
reduces the risks of that phone information will be compromised.  To help with this task, you can 
build your app with default system file permissions and avoid difficult decisions about security, but 
it's better if we adapt the security to our requirements.
Here we present the most relevant core advices:
• With the Sandbox from our Android application, we are able to avoid the code execution 
from outside of our app, from others apps.
• An application framework with robust implementations of common security functionality 
such as cryptography, permissions, and secure IPC. 
• Technologies like ASLR, NX, ProPolice, safe_iop, OpenBSD dlmalloc, OpenBSD calloc, 
and Linux mmap_min_addr to reduce the risks associated with the most common memory 
errors.
• We can use an encrypted file-system, with that we will able to protect our, if our mobile 
device or stolen.
• We can use a system of permissions to restrict the access to system features.
• Application-defined permissions to control application data on a per-app basis. 
Notwithstanding, it is very important to build a robust app,  that we be familiar with the 
Android security  best  practices.   If  we follow these practices  we will  reduce the likelihood of 
inadvertently introducing security issues that could make could make easier to steal information 
from our mobile.
 6.1 Storing data
One of the most important concern for Android is, if the data that we save on the mobile is 
accessible to other apps that shares the device. We have three ways to store our information on the 
device.
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 6.1.1 Using internal storage
By default,  files that we create on internal storage are accessible only to your app. This  
protection is implemented by Android and is sufficient for most applications.
We  should  generally  avoid  using  the  MODE_WORLD_WRITEABLE  or 
MODE_WORLD_READABLE modes for IPC files because they do not provide the ability to limit 
data access to particular applications, nor do they provide any control on data format. If we want to 
share your data with other app processes, we might instead consider using a content provider, which 
offers read and write permissions to other apps and can make dynamic permission grants on a 
case-by-case basis.
To provide additional protection for sensitive data, we might choose to encrypt local files 
using a key that is not directly accessible to the application. Bur we have some problems to solve  
before  encrypt  our  data,  for  example,  choose  the  correct  data,  where  to  store  the  key,  which 
algorithm we will use, we have many problems to solve as we can see in [37] before choose the 
proper way. 
 6.1.2 Using external storage
Files  created  on  external  storage,  such  as  SD  Cards,  are  readable  and  writeable  by 
everybody.  Because  external  storage  can  be  removed  by  the  user  and  also  modified  by  any 
application, we should not store sensitive information using external storage.
As with data from any untrusted source, we should perform input validation when handling 
data from external storage.  If your app does retrieve executable files from external storage, the files 
must be signed and cryptographically verified prior to dynamic loading, in order to prevent possible 
infection by a potential virus.
 6.1.3 Using content providers
Content providers offer a structured storage mechanism that can be limited to your own 
application or exported to allow access by other applications. If we do not intend to provide other 
applications  with  access  to  our  ContentProvider,  mark  them  as  android:exported=false  in  the 
application manifest.  Otherwise,  set the android:exported attribute "true" to allow other apps to 
access the stored data. But that last option it's not recommended to share information with other 
apps, unless we can trust on these apps.
When creating a ContentProvider that will be exported for use by other applications, we can 
specify a single permission for reading and writing, or distinct permissions for reading and writing 
62
within the manifest. We recommend that you limit your permissions to those required to accomplish 
the task at hand. We have to keep in mind that it’s usually easier to add permissions later to expose 
new functionality than it is to take them away and break existing users.
If  we are  using  a  content  provider  for  sharing  data  between only  your  own apps,  it  is 
preferable  to  use  the  android:protectionLevel  attribute  set  to  "signature"  protection.  Signature 
permissions do not require user confirmation, so they provide a better user experience and more 
controlled access to the content provider data when the apps accessing the data are signed with the 
same key.
Content  providers  can  also  provide  more  granular  access  by  declaring  the 
android:grantUriPermissions attribute and using the FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION 
and  FLAG_GRANT_WRITE_URI_PERMISSION  flags  in  the  Intent  object  that  activates  the 
component.  The scope of these permissions can be further limited by the <grant-uri-permission 
element>.
When  accessing  a  content  provider,  use  parametrized  query  methods  such  as  query(), 
update(),  and delete()  to  avoid potential  SQL injection from untrusted sources.  Note that  using 
parametrized methods is not sufficient if the selection argument is built by concatenating user data 
prior to submitting it to the method.
Do not have a false sense of security about the write permission. Consider that the write 
permission allows SQL statements which make it possible for some data to be confirmed using 
creative WHERE clauses and parsing the results. For example, an attacker might probe for presence 
of a specific phone number in a call-log by modifying a row only if that phone number already 
exists. If the content provider data has predictable structure, the write permission may be equivalent 
to providing both reading and writing.
 6.2 Using Permissions
Because Android sandboxes applications from each other, applications must explicitly share 
resources and data. They do this by declaring the permissions they need for additional capabilities 
not provided by the basic sandbox, including access to device features such as the camera.
 6.2.1 Requesting Permissions
We recommend minimizing the number of permissions that your app requests not having 
access to sensitive permissions reduces the risk of inadvertently misusing those permissions, can 
improve user adoption, and makes your app less for attackers. Generally, if a permission is not 
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required for your app to function, do not request it.
In addition to requesting permissions, your application can use the <permissions> to protect 
IPC that is security sensitive and will be exposed to other applications, such as a ContentProvider.  
In  general,  we recommend using  access  controls  other  than  user  confirmed permissions  where 
possible because permissions can be confusing for users.
Do not leak permission-protected data. This occurs when your app exposes data over IPC 
that is only available because it has a specific permission, but does not require that permission of 
any clients of it’s IPC interface. More details on the potential impacts, and frequency of this type of 
problem  is  provided  in  this  research  paper  published  at  USENIX:  http://www.cs.be 
rkeley.edu/~afelt/felt_usenixsec2011.pdf
 6.2.2 Creating Permissions
Generally, we should strive to define as few permissions as possible while satisfying your 
security requirements. Creating a new permission is relatively uncommon for most applications, 
because the system-defined permissions cover many situations. Where appropriate, perform access 
checks using existing permissions.
If we must create a new permission, consider whether you can accomplish your task with a 
"signature" protection level. Signature permissions are transparent to the user and only allow access 
by applications signed by the same developer as application performing the permission check.
If  we create  a  permission with  the  "dangerous" protection  level,  there  are  a  number  of 
complexities that you need to consider:
• The permission must have a string that concisely expresses to a user the security decision 
they will be required to make.
•  The permission string must be localized to many different languages.
•  Users may choose not to install an application because a permission is confusing or 
perceived as risky.
• Applications may request the permission when the creator of the permission has not been 
installed.
Each of  these  poses  a  significant  non-technical  challenge  for  you as  the  developer  while  also 
confusing your users, which is why we discourage the use of the "dangerous" permission level.
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 6.3 Summary
As conclusion we can say that if we invest a little more time, in the facets that are related 
with the security and best practices we will increase the safety of our application. Also the final user 
must have attention when install app from non-GooglePlay apps because we don't know the origin 
of these apps, we can be installing applications do not do what they really say. As well we have to 
have  care with the  GooglePlay apps,  above all  we have to  keep in  mid the apps permissions, 
because most of then are over-privilege closer to the 30%[43], in may cases we can found apps (like 
a torch[44]),  that demanded an access to the GPS,  check the identity and phone status,  access to 
the camera, network connections access, USB access, awesome for a torch, that only access to the 
flash.
As we can  see  at  the  previous  tables,  the  most  insecure  mobiles  it's  the model  C,   the 
Samsung Galaxy S with Cyanogen Mod 9.2, why? The principal difference between that mobile 
with the others, it's the installed rom, in one hand we have the official manufacturers Roms and in 
the other hand, we have the unofficial roms, that are made by amateurs programmers, took from an 
official  rom  or  a  rom  made  by  another  amateur,  and  they  start  changing  and  modifying  the 
behaviour of the system, opening new ways to improve the system, like having more options to 
customize our mobiles, add new functions offering new ways to modify for example the parameters 
of the CPU, but, who can ensure that this rom it doesn’t have a service monitoring our device or a 
trojan? Opposite of that, we have the official roms, made by the mobile manufactures, in these roms 
we  have  few  possibilities  to  customize  the  system  or  some  times  we  can  not  un-install  the 
pre-installed manufacturer apps. We don't have any chance to modify the behaviour of the system. 
May be we have a safer rom, but nobody can claim that, our manufactures has included a tracker or 
similar.  
 7 Conclusion and further work
Based on what we've seen in this master's thesis, we know the potential risks that exist in our 
mobile devices, we know that a malicious application can not require many special permits. We 
know, what we can do with only a couple of permissions, extract information from our SD card and 
send it to their servers, for example.
But how can we prevent the attacks against Android by these malicious apps? In fact there is 
not a perfect formula to protect us from these attacks, we can affirm that is better if we don't install  
any third-party apps,  is better if we install apps that have passes the filter of Google Play market,  
although some of these apps are malicious, nothing is certain.
Unfortunately,  the current  anti-virus  that  we have  available  for  Android  systems do not 
solve these problems, they can not do anything against this kind of attacks. We believe that what we 
really need is to improve the current Android sandbox. The security of the applications made for 
Android,  should  come from the  programmers  themselves,  a  major  improvement  would be  that 
development  tools  incorporate  options  for  detecting  potential  security  flaws,  implementing 
mechanisms to protect against SQL injection, directory traversal vulnerabilities and maybe, improve 
the control access to the SD card, defining the limits, which can read and can not read, for example 
limit the app access to the SD card,  giving permission, to read and write, to the own folder of the 
application. 
Mercury has shown us how easy, it can be for an application to access to the sensitive data 
from your mobile device, with only, and we have to empathise that, the Internet permission, so what 
it can be happening when we install an app that requires the permission of “access to accounts”, the 
access to SD Card and the Internet, who can claim, that, our information is not being sent to a 
third-party company? therefore, or mobile is far away from begin secure.
Currently, the development and distribution of software for Android is much faster than the 
security improvements, unless we begin to focus on our security applications, or in improving the 
security model of the system itself, soon, we may be facing one scenario where most applications 
are malicious, and perhaps it can be the end of Android.
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 8 ITACA Research Day
We have displayed our work in the ITACA Research Day, with the reference, J. Mozos, D.  
de Andrés, J. Friginal, J.-C. Ruiz, "A study of vulnerabilities on Android systems: supporting tools 
and best practices", Jornada de investigación del IUI ITACA, Valencia, Spain, June 28, 2013.
Due to the size of the image, we prefer to take up one page, to make easier it's reading, we can see it  
at figure 25.
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Figure 25: Itaca poster
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 10 Annex
 10.1 Automating the experiments: Masquerade
In this section we are going to explain how we automated a part of the experiments, we 
couldn’t automate all, by Mercury's limitations and complexity.
 10.1.1 Masquerade
 Masquerade  is  what  his  name says,  a  mask on Mercury,  we don't  have  to  know how 
Mercury works,  we can access to almost all features with a simple menu. We will take a look to all 
the sections at the figure 26.
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Figure 26: Masquerade menu
 10.1.1.1 Activities
With the option 1) Activities, we can find al the exported activities in our device, with the 
package name, at the figure 27 we can see an output example, we can redirect the output to an txt 
file:
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Figure 27: Activities output
 10.1.1.2 Broadcasts
In this option we can, find all the exported broadcasts from the installed activities, we can 
redirect the output to an txt file. At the figure 28 we can see an example of the output.
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Figure 28: Broadcasts output
 10.1.1.3 Package Menu
Here we have a sub-menu, because we van make several options with the packages, at the 
image 29 we can see the options:
• Option 1): just a list of installed packages
• Option 2): we obtain information about the installed packages, with the UID, with the whole 
path, and the permissions that requires that package.
• Option 3): we obtain only the packages that shares their UIDs.
• Option 4): we obtain only the packages that are debuggeable.
As the other menus we can always redirect the output to an txt file.
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Figure 29: Package sub-menu
 10.1.1.4 Providers
Here we can search for all the providers installed in our mobile device as we can see at the 
figure 30, an example of the output, we can find:
• The package name and path, com.tmobile.thememaneger.com.
• The owner authority,  com.tmobile.thememaneger.packageresources.
• The read and write permissions.
• The multiprocess flag.
• The grant uri permissions flag.
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Figure 30: Providers output
 10.1.1.5 Services
With that option we can find all the exported services in our mobile device, at the figure 31 
we can see an example of the output of this command, the services running in a real mobile device.  
We can see the package, the activity that starts the service and the permissions.
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Figure 31: Services output
 10.1.1.6 Exploits menu
Here we can launch the pre-installed exploits in Mercury, we have two options, read the 
APN content provider and read the settings content providers, as we can see at the figure 32.
 10.1.1.7 Information menu
In the figure 33 we can see that menu, here can find the general information from the device, 
• Print date/time from the device, we get the time in seconds 
• Get verbose device information, we get the device, linux version, the /system/build.prop 
information.
•  List all the package permissions, we get all the permissions from the installed packages in 
our device.
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Figure 32: Exploits menu
Figure 33: Information sub- menu
 10.1.1.8 Scanner menu
Here we have the scanner sub-menu, here we can find the general searches, and the tests 
from know bugs or vulnerabilities. At the figure 34 we can see the menu.
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Figure 34: Scanner sub-menu
 10.1.1.9 Generate general info 
At the figure 35 we can see the txt file generated by the option general report  here we 
have overall resume, with the most relevant orders of Mercury. 
We have decided to redirect directly the output to an txt file, because is a lot of information 
to show it on the screen, and it's better to read it in a file or print it.
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Figure 35: general info example
 10.1.1.10 SQL Injection
Here we can find the option to find the vulnerable content providers vulnerable to the SQL 
injections, once we have the vulnerable contents we can launch selects to look for the information 
that they contain. In the figure 36 we can find an example of total SQL analysis from a Samsung 
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Figure 36: SQL vulnerabilities
 11 Intents classification
Here we have made a classification of the known Intents and broadcasts, depending on the 
input, output, only accessible by the system.
All  actions  are  preceded  by  android.intent.action, information  extracted  from  Android 
Developers
B= Broadcast Action    A= Activity Action
No data input or output With Input data Only accessible by the system (2) 
(3)
No data entry with 
extra data
Without input data, 
with output data in, 
with extra data
ALL_APPS   A ATTACH_DATA (1) BATTERY_LOW  B CALL (4) A CHOOSER (6) A
ANSWER  A DELETE A (8) BATTERY_CHANGED    B DOCK_EVENT B 
(10)
CREATE_SHORTCUT 
(7)  A
APP_ERROR  A WEB_SEARCH A BATTERY_OKAY B HEADSET_PLUG 
B (14)
PROVIDER_
CHANGED B  (29)
ASSIST  A EDIT A BOOT_COMPLETED B
BUG_REPORT A GET_CONTENT A (13) CONFIGURATION_CHANGED 
B
CALL_BUTTON A INSERT A (15) DREAMING_STARTED B
CAMERA_BUTTON (5) A INSERT_OR_EDIT A 
(16)
DREAMING_STOPPED B 
SEARCH_LONG_PRESS 
A
INSTALL_PACKAGE A 
(17)
NEW_OUTGOING_CALL B (18)
SENDTO A  (33) PASTE A  (26) PACKAGE_ADDED  B (19)
SET_WALLPAPER A PICK A (27) PACKAGE_CHANGED B (20)
SYNC A PICK_ACTIVITY A (28) PACKAGE_DATA_CLEARED B 
(21)
FACTORY_TEST A RUN A (30) PACKAGE_FIRST_LAUNCH B 
VOICE_COMMAND A SEARCH A (31) PACKAGE_FULLY_REMOVED 
B (22)
MAIN A SEND A (32) PACKAGE_NEEDS_
VERIFICATION B
MANAGE_NETWORK
_USAGE A
ATTACH_DATA PACKAGE_REMOVED B (23)
POWER_USAGE_
SUMMARY A
SEND_MULTIPLE A (34) PACKAGE_REPLACED B (24)
GTALK_CONNECTED B SYSTEM_TUTORIAL  A 
(35)
PACKAGE_RESTARTED B (25)
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GTALK_
DISCONNECTED 
ACTION_UNINSTALL_P
ACKAGE A (37)
PACKAGE_VERIFIED B 
INPUT_METHOD_
CHANGED B
VIEW A ACTION_POWER_
CONNECTED B
MANAGE_PACKAGE_
STORAGE B
ACTION_POWER_
DISCONNECTED B
MEDIA_BAD_REMOVAL 
B
REBOOT B
MEDIA_BUTTON B SCREEN_OFF B
MEDIA_CHECKING B SCREEN_ON B
MEDIA_EJECT B ACTION_SHUTDOWN B
MEDIA_MOUNTED B TIMEZONE_CHANGED B (36)
MEDIA_NOFS B TIME_TICK B
MEDIA_REMOVED B UID_REMOVED B
MEDIA_SCANNER_FINI
SHED B
USER_PRESENT B
MEDIA_SCANNER_
SCAN_FILE B
EXTERNAL_APPLICATIONS_
AVAILABLE B (11)
MEDIA_SCANNER_
STARTED B
EXTERNAL_APPLICATIONS_
UNAVAILABLE B (12)
MEDIA_SHARED B MY_PACKAGE_REPLACED B
MEDIA_
UNMOUNTABLE B
DEVICE_STORAGE_OK B (9)
MEDIA_UNMOUNTED B DEVICE_STORAGE_LOW B
QUICK_CLOCK LOCALE_CHANGED B
TIME_SET B
USER_BACKGROUND
USER_FOREGROUND
(1) getData() is URI of data to be attached
(2) This is a protected intent that can only be sent by the system
(3) Sin datos de entrada
(4) If nothing, an empty dialer is started; else getData() is URI of a phone number to be dialed or a 
tel: URI of an explicit phone number
(5) Includes a single extra field, EXTRA_KEY_EVENT, containing the key event that caused the 
broadcast
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(6)  No data  should be specified.  get*Extra  must have a  EXTRA_INTENT field containing the 
Intent being executed, and can optionally have a EXTRA_TITLE field containing the title text to 
display in the chooser.
     Output: Depends on the protocol of EXTRA_INTENT.
(7)  Output:  An  Intent  representing  the  shortcut.  The  intent  must  contain  three  extras: 
SHORTCUT_INTENT  (value:  Intent),  SHORTCUT_NAME  (value:  String),  and 
SHORTCUT_ICON  (value:  Bitmap)  or  SHORTCUT_ICON_RESOURCE  (value: 
ShortcutIconResource).
(8) getData() is URI of data to be deleted.
(9) If nothing, an empty dialer is started; else getData() is URI of a phone number to be dialed or a 
tel: URI of an explicit phone number.
(10)EXTRA_DOCK_STATE -  the  current  dock  state,  indicating  which  dock  the  device  is 
physically in.
(11)EXTRA_CHANGED_PACKAGE_LIST is  the  set  of  packages  whose  resources(were 
previously unavailable) are currently available. EXTRA_CHANGED_UID_LIST is  the  set  of 
uids of the packages whose resources(were previously unavailable) are currently available.
(12)EXTRA_CHANGED_PACKAGE_LIST is the set of packages whose resources are no longer 
available. EXTRA_CHANGED_UID_LIST is the set of packages whose resources are no longer 
available. 
(13) Input: getType() is the desired MIME type to retrieve. Note that no URI is supplied in the 
intent, as there are no constraints on where the returned data  originally  comes  from.  You  may 
also include the CATEGORY_OPENABLE if you can only accept data that can be opened as a 
stream. You may use EXTRA_LOCAL_ONLY to limit content selection to local data.
       Output: The URI of the item that was picked. This must be a content: URI so that any receiver  
can access it. 
(14) The intent will have the following extra values: 
• state - 0 for unplugged, 1 for plugged. 
• name - Headset type, human readable string 
• microphone - 1 if headset has a microphone, 0 otherwise 
(15)Input: getData() is URI of the directory (vnd.android.cursor.dir/*) in which to place the data. 
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      Output: URI of the new data that was created. 
(16) Input: getType() is the desired MIME type of the item to create or edit. The extras can contain 
type specific data to pass through to the editing/creating activity. 
Output:  The URI of the item that was picked. This must be a content:  URI so that any 
receiver can access it. 
(17) Input: The data must be a content: or file: URI at which the application can be retrieved. As of 
JELLY_BEAN_MR1, you can also use "package:EXTRA_INSTALLER_PACKAGE_NAME, 
EXTRA_NOT_UNKNOWN_SOURCE,  EXTRA_ALLOW_REPLACE,  and  
EXTRA_RETURN_RESULT. 
Output: If EXTRA_RETURN_RESULT, returns whether the install succeeded.
(18)The Intent will have the following extra value: 
• EXTRA_PHONE_NUMBER - the phone number originally intended to be dialed. 
(19) May include the following extras: 
• EXTRA_UID containing the integer uid assigned to the new package. 
• EXTRA_REPLACING is  set  to  true  if  this  is  following  an 
ACTION_PACKAGE_REMOVED broadcast for the same package. 
(20) The data contains the name of the package. 
• EXTRA_UID containing the integer uid assigned to the package. 
• EXTRA_CHANGED_COMPONENT_NAME_LIST containing  the  class  name  of  the 
changed components. 
• EXTRA_DONT_KILL_APP containing  boolean  field  to  override  the  default  action  of 
restarting the application. 
(21) The data contains the name of the package. 
• EXTRA_UID containing the integer uid assigned to the package. 
(22) Broadcast Action: An existing application package has been completely removed from the 
device. The data contains the name of the package. This is  like 
ACTION_PACKAGE_REMOVED, but  only  set  when  EXTRA_DATA_REMOVED is  true  and 
EXTRA_REPLACING is false of that broadcast. 
• EXTRA_UID containing the integer uid previously assigned to the package. 
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(23)Broadcast Action: An existing application package has been removed from the device. The data 
contains the name of the package. The package that  is  being  installed  does  not receive  this 
Intent. 
• EXTRA_UID containing the integer uid previously assigned to the package. 
• EXTRA_DATA_REMOVED is set to true if the entire application -- data and code -- is 
being removed. 
• EXTRA_REPLACING is  set  to  true  if  this  will  be  followed  by  an 
ACTION_PACKAGE_ADDED broadcast for the same package. 
(24) May include the following extras: 
• EXTRA_UID containing the integer uid assigned to the new package. 
(25) The data contains the name of the package. 
• EXTRA_UID containing the integer uid assigned to the package. 
(26) Input: getData() is URI containing a directory of data (vnd.android.cursor.dir/*) from which to 
pick an item. 
Output: The URI of the item that was picked. 
(27)Input: getData() is URI containing a directory of data (vnd.android.cursor.dir/*) from which to 
pick an item. 
Output: The URI of the item that was picked. 
(28)  Input: get*Extra field  EXTRA_INTENT is an Intent used with  queryIntentActivities(Intent, 
int) to determine the set of activities from which to pick. 
Output: Class name of the activity that was selected. 
(29) The intent will have the following extra values: 
• count - The number of items in the data set. This is the same as the number of items in the  
cursor returned by querying the data URI. 
(30) Input: ? (Note: this is currently specific to the test harness.)
(31) Input: getStringExtra(SearchManager.QUERY) is the text to search for. If empty, simply enter 
your search results Activity with the search UI activated. 
 (32)Input:  getType() is  the  MIME  type  of  the  data  being  sent.  get*Extra  can  have  either  a 
EXTRA_TEXT or EXTRA_STREAM field, containing the data  to  be  sent.  If  using 
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EXTRA_TEXT, the MIME type should be "text/plain"; otherwise it should be the MIME type of 
the data in EXTRA_STREAM. Use */* if  the MIME type is  unknown (this  will  only allow 
senders that can handle generic data streams). If using EXTRA_TEXT, you can also optionally 
supply EXTRA_HTML_TEXT for clients to retrieve your text with HTML formatting. 
(33 ) Input: getData() is URI describing the target. 
(34) Input: getType() is the MIME type of the data being sent. get*ArrayListExtra can have either a 
EXTRA_TEXT or EXTRA_STREAM field, containing the data to be sent.  If  using 
EXTRA_TEXT, you can also optionally supply EXTRA_HTML_TEXT for clients to retrieve your 
text with HTML formatting. 
(35) Input: getStringExtra(SearchManager.QUERY) is the text to search for. If empty, simply enter 
your search results Activity with the search UI activated.
(36) The intent will have the following extra values:
• time-zone - The java.util.TimeZone.getID() value identifying the new time zone. 
(37)Input: The data must be a package: URI whose scheme specific part is the package name of the 
current installed package to be uninstalled. You can optionally  supply  
EXTRA_RETURN_RESULT. 
Output: If EXTRA_RETURN_RESULT, returns whether the install succeeded. 
(38)Input: getData() is URI from which to retrieve data. 
(39)Input: getStringExtra(SearchManager.QUERY) is the text to search for. If it is a url starts with 
http or https, the site will be opened. If it is plain text, Google search will be applied. 
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